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Abstract 
Investment banks are in the business of taking calculated risks. Risk management 
infrastructure facilitates the safe pursuit of profits and the balancing of associated risks. By 
2006, Lehman Brothers was thought to have a very respectable risk management system, 
and even its regulator, the Securities and Exchange Commission, viewed its risk framework 
as being fully compliant with regulatory requirements. In its public disclosures, Lehman 
characterized its risk controls as “meaningful constraints on its risk taking” and evidence of 
its continued financial stability. Beginning in late 2006, however, Lehman began dismantling 
its carefully crafted risk management framework as it pursued a new high-leverage growth 
strategy. During the next two years, it exceeded many risk limits, aggressively increased a 
number of risk metrics, disregarded its risk procedures, and excluded risk management 
personnel from key decisions. In October 2007, it replaced its well-regarded chief risk officer 
with a seasoned deal maker who lacked professional risk management experience. This case 
considers the value of a risk management system and how it functioned (and then did not) 
to constrain risk taking at Lehman. It also considers the role of its regulator.  
  
_____________________________________________________________________ 
1 This case study is one of eight Yale Program on Financial Stability (YPFS) case modules considering the 
Lehman Brothers Bankruptcy:  
• The Lehman Brothers Bankruptcy A: Overview 
• The Lehman Brothers Bankruptcy B: Risk Limits and Stress Tests 
• The Lehman Brothers Bankruptcy C: Managing the Balance Sheet Through the Use of Repo 105 
•  The Lehman Brothers Bankruptcy D: The Role of Ernst & Young  
•  The Lehman Brothers Bankruptcy E: The Effects on Lehman’s U.S. Broker-Dealer  
•  The Lehman Brothers Bankruptcy F: Introduction to the ISDA Master Agreement  
•  The Lehman Brothers Bankruptcy G: The Special Case of Derivatives  
•  The Lehman Brothers Bankruptcy H: The Global Contagion.  
Cases are available from the Journal of Financial Stability.   
2 Director, The Global Financial Crisis Project and Senior Editor, YPFS, Yale School of Management 
3 Janet L. Yellen Professor of Finance and Management at the Yale School of Management, and YPFS Program 
Director, Yale School of Management  
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1.   Introduction  
In March 2006 Lehman Brothers adopted a new business strategy to grow its proprietary 
business with a focus on commercial real estate, leveraged loans, and private equity—
businesses that consumed more capital, and that were generally riskier and more illiquid 
than Lehman’s traditional lines of business. The firm financed this expansion with its 
customary short-term borrowings from the overnight wholesale funding markets, 
significantly increasing its leverage. This aggressive new strategy would eventually lead to 
the firm abandoning much of its state-of-the-art risk management framework and would 
ultimately result in the firm’s demise.  
Investment banks are in the business of taking calculated risks; Lehman’s risk management 
framework was supposed to enable it to safely pursue profits while balancing associated 
risks. By 2006, Lehman Brothers was thought to have a very respectable risk management 
system, and its regulator, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), viewed its risk 
framework as being fully compliant with regulatory requirements. In its public disclosures 
Lehman characterized its risk controls as “meaningful constraints on its risk taking” and 
evidence of its continued financial stability.  
Beginning in late 2006, however, Lehman began dismantling its risk management 
framework in pursuit of its new growth strategy. It exceeded many risk limits, aggressively 
increased a number of risk metrics, disregarded its risk procedures, and excluded risk 
management personnel from key decisions (Examiner’s Report, vol. 1, 46). In September 
2007, Lehman’s well-regarded chief risk officer (CRO) and management “agreed to disagree,” 
and a new CRO was installed (World Bank). (Also see Footnote 6.) 
During 2007, as the real estate crisis worsened, Lehman continued to pursue deals without 
the benefit of key risk metrics. By late 2007, because of its concentration in real estate assets 
and external developments, Lehman found it harder and more expensive to access funding. 
In March 2008, after the fire sale of Bear Stearns to JPMorgan Chase, the SEC embedded 
personnel at Lehman to more closely monitor its financial situation. Although SEC personnel 
became aware that Lehman was violating its risk limits, the agency did not make additional 
inquiries or require the firm to reduce its risk taking. The agency would be criticized for 
sitting idly by while the firm collapsed. On September 15, 2008, unable to fund its operations, 
Lehman filed for bankruptcy, initiating the largest bankruptcy in United States history. 
This case will enable readers to (1) become familiar with the elements of a risk management 
framework, (2) consider the effectiveness of such a system given the constraints and pulls of 
business, and (3) evaluate the role of regulators in enforcing risk management so as to 
minimize risks to the entity’s financial stability. 
The balance of this case is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses the role of risk 
management at Lehman, and Section 3 discusses risk appetite, a novel metric that was at the 
center of Lehman’s risk management system. Section 4 describes the growth strategy that 
Lehman adopted in 2006 that led to the changes in its risk management, which are described 
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in Section 5. Section 6 concludes with a discussion of the regulatory environment and the 
role of the regulators. 
Questions 
1. Does a risk framework really matter?   
2. What are the elements of an effective risk framework?   
3. Can a risk management system ever be an effective constraint on excessive risk taking 
given the pressure to pursue profits?  
4. What should the regulator’s role be? 
2.   Risk Management at Lehman 
In 1999, Lehman enhanced its risk management department by hiring Madelyn Antoncic to 
be its global head of risk policy. Antoncic came to the firm with a PhD in economics, and years 
working in market risk and selling structured products at Goldman Sachs and Barclay’s. In 
2002, Antoncic was promoted to chief risk officer, a position that she would hold until 
December 2007.4 With the support of management, she set out to build a “world-class risk 
function,” one that would combine talented personnel, validated metrics and limits, and 
integrated procedures into a framework of constant monitoring. Monitoring risks and the 
remedial procedures were intended to ensure that the firm maintained an organized balance 
of risk and designed to maximize returns while not running afoul of its financial targets.  
Lehman’s Risk Infrastructure: An Integrated Framework 
Antoncic’s background enabled her to understand the risk analytics, as well as the business, 
something that she thought crucial to a successful risk structure. Under Antoncic’s direction, 
Lehman’s Global Risk Management Division (GRMD) was an independent global function 
within the firm that worked collaboratively with the businesses to set appropriate limits and 
proactively assist in structuring deals, while minimizing risk. Risk managers advised 
regarding new business, new or enhanced products, and client concentrations. The GRMD 
was charged with three core functions, as shown in Figure 1.  
Figure 1: Lehman’s Global Risk Management Division (GRMD)Three Core Functions 
Core Function Implementing Task 
Understand and identify all risks. 
Create metrics to measure the risk for all 
products. 
 Ensure that appropriate limits are in 
place for all transactions and products. 
Define a “risk appetite.” 
Protect the firm against “catastrophic” 
loss. 
Measure and monitor “tail risk.” 
Source: Lehman Risk Presentation 2007, 18. 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
4 See YPFS case study Wiggins et al. 2014A for biographical information about key Lehman officers.  
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GRMD pursued these objectives through four groups: Market Risk Management, Credit Risk 
Management, Quantitative Risk Management, and Risk Control and Analysis. The first two of 
these groups, Market Risk Management and Credit Risk Management, had global and firm-
wide responsibility for their respective areas. The latter two groups, Quantitative Risk 
Management and Risk Control and Analytics, provided firm-wide technical support to the 
firm’s risk operations. Additional functions relating to sovereign and operational risk, 
proprietary trading, and strategic partners were directed by the CRO as shown in Figure 2.  
Figure 2: Lehman Risk Management Function: An Integrated Framework 
Position/Department Scope of Responsibility 
Executive Administration All risk areas globally 
Chief Risk Officer All risk areas globally 
Market Risk Management  Market risk globally 
Credit Risk Management  Credit risk globally 
Quantitative Risk Management 
Market, credit, and operational risk analytics and 
model validation  
Risk Control and Analysis 
Risk reporting & analysis, credit ratings, data 
integrity, policies and procedures, and technology 
Sovereign Risk Management 
Responsible for non-U.S. political, economic, and 
social conditions and events 
IMD Risk Management 
Risk Management for the investment division, 
including asset management and private equity 
Operational Risk Management Operational risk globally 
Proprietary Trading, Strategic 
Partnerships and Principal Investing 
Risk Management 
Management for global trading strategies, global 
principal strategies, and global strategic investments 
Source: Lehman Risk Presentation 2007, 12. 
Talented Personnel 
By 2007 the GRM had 398 risk management staff (up from 156 in 2005), and Lehman touted 
that “Risk Management is one of the core competencies of the Firm and is an intrinsic 
component of our control system” (Lehman Risk Presentation 2007, 14). Lehman’s risk 
management policy was distributed firm-wide and supported by detailed procedures. As 
CRO, Antoncic sat on the management committee and reported to the chief administrative 
officer, who was a member of the executive committee and reported to the chairman and 
chief executive officer. As was noted in the firm’s presentation: 
Risk Management is one of the core competencies of the Firm and is an intrinsic 
component of our control system. As a result of our focus on continuously enhancing 
our risk capabilities, in the current challenging environment, we feel confident that 
our risk position is solid… [t]he overall philosophy of [the] Firm is that we have zero 
tolerance for ignoring limits and internal process. 
As CRO, Antoncic hired risk managers who were highly qualified professionals, many of 
whom were either former traders, former desk quants or had relevant business experience 
in addition to their PhDs. At Lehman, risk managers were embedded at the trading desks to 
act as advisors, not police. They met daily with business unit management regarding large 
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and unusual transactions and limits. They actively monitored adherence to risk limits and 
quickly reported exceptions and counseled as to remedies. (For more detail regarding the 
organization and responsibilities of GRMD, see pages 5-16 of the Lehman Risk Presentation 
2007 and the SEC’s CSE Review.)  
Risk Models and Limits 
Lehman, like most investment banks, utilized various models and methodologies to 
constantly measure the different types of risks that it was undertaking in the numerous parts 
of its business. It would typically establish a limit (usually expressed as a dollar value) as the 
safe level of risk that the company would take on in a particular area, e.g., portfolio limits, 
single-transaction limits, country limits, and counterparty credit limits. Limits were 
recommended by the GRMD, approved by the executive committee, and then disseminated 
down throughout the organization, so that a particular trading desk or division would have 
an established operating limit. 
The GRMD would then employ different methodologies and models on a daily basis to 
constantly measure the company’s performance against this limit. These methodologies and 
metrics included value-at-risk (VaR), maximum potential exposure (MPE), risk appetite, and 
risk equity. Which metric was used depended on the firm’s businesses. For example, VaR was 
used with respect to monitoring the firm’s market risk. Because Lehman placed particular 
focus on its use of a somewhat novel risk appetite limit, we discuss it in detail below in 
Section 3. 
The Quantitative Risk Management Group (QRM) of the Lehman GRMD was responsible for 
developing, implementing and maintaining the risk methodologies and systems used by the 
risk management subgroups to monitor the firm’s major risks—market risks, credit risks, 
and operational risks. A model validation subgroup also validated the pricing models used 
by the firm’s trading units. Lehman reported the results of its risk monitoring to the SEC as 
part of its obligations as a Consolidated Supervised Entity (CSE). (See discussion in Section 
6.)  
(For more information, see Lehman Quantitative Risk Policy Manual for details of how QRM 
operated. See Lehman Market Risk Overview 2008 and Lehman 2007 Form 10-K, Item 1A 
Risk Factors, 14-21 for the firm’s disclosures regarding risks.)  
Stress Testing 
While risk limits were designed to measure the daily risk that the firm took on, the GRMD 
was also charged with monitoring the impact that an unlikely but catastrophic event would 
have on the firm. This was done by running stress scenarios that simulated significant 
socioeconomic events and their accompanying financial impacts. Some of the stress tests 
utilized by Lehman simulated the 9/11 attacks, the collapse of Long-Term Capital 
Management, the Russian financial crisis and Black Monday. Lehman reported the results of 
its stress tests to the SEC as part of its CSE obligations.  
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Although Lehman’s stress tests included several that were designed to simulate a significant 
downturn in the mortgage and real estate markets, it did not run stress scenarios that 
simulated a widespread mortgage crash as happened. “No one could have predicted a 
downturn of the magnitude and scale that occurred; it had never happened before, such a 
downturn without a precipitating economic event. This time, the housing crash was the 
precipitating event” (Antoncic, 2010).  
(For a detailed analysis of Lehman’s risk management, see Examiner’s Report, Vol. 8, 
Appendix 8 (detailed analysis of Lehman’s risk management). For the various stress 
scenarios that Lehman applied, see Lehman Risk Presentation 2007, Appendix.) 
3.   Risk Appetite Limit 
Although most of its peer firms managed credit risk and market risk separately, Lehman 
chose to also utilize a combined metric, risk appetite, to manage its risks on an integrated 
basis. Risk appetite represented the firm’s overall risk tolerance and was based on its 
budgeted financial targets. Lehman often described risk appetite as being at “the center of 
our approach to risk” (Lehman Risk Presentation 2007, 23). The risk appetite represented 
the quantity that the firm was “prepared to lose” in a year from market, counterparty, credit, 
and event risk. It was defined and measured at a 95% level of confidence (Ibid, 21-23). 
Firm-wide risk appetite limits were recommended by GRMD and approved by the Executive 
Committee in January after the board had approved the firm’s budget. Once determined, like 
other limits, the firm-wide risk appetite limit was cascaded down throughout the firm to the 
different divisions, businesses, and regions. Trading-desk heads allocated limits to individual 
desks. Limits were monitored daily and jointly by the business people and risk managers. 
(See Examiner’s Report, Vol. 8, Appendix 10 for analysis of the 2007 and 2008 risk appetite 
limit calculations.) 
Figure 3: Lehman’s Formula for Calculating Risk Appetite 
 
Source: Lehman Risk Presentation 2007, 22. 
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While Lehman’s use of risk appetite was somewhat novel at the time,5 the SEC found the 
measure to have some useful merit: 
From a practical perspective, the RA exposure metric serves as a useful 
comprehensive risk tool for senior management. When used in conjunction with the 
“standard” risk management tools (daily VaR, MPE, etc.), RA may facilitate more 
active comprehensive risk management than most firms’ tools allow. However, from 
a statistical and financial theory perspective, the RA metric has some notable 
limitations. Whether it makes sense to compare one unit of market risk (from an 
annualized VaR) with one unit of credit risk (from a statistical aggregation technique) 
with one unit of event risk (from a set of subjectively specified stresses in some 
instances), is open to debate. Also, the degree of subjective parameterization, which 
is required for the calculation to be made, raises some questions. More broadly, while 
aggregating to a single metric is appealing, the benefits of doing so must be weighed 
against the risk of having risk measures become less meaningful” (SEC CSE Review, 
61). 
Risk Appetite Usage  
As with other risk limits, once the risk appetite limit was established and disseminated, 
GRMD monitored daily usage against the risk appetite limit allocated to different 
departments and businesses to determine the company’s overall risk appetite usage. 
Breaches of the limit were reported to management and resolved according to firm policy, 
which took into consideration the cause of the breach. (A similar process would have been 
followed for other types of breaches as well.) An “active” breach caused by trader activity 
would likely be reduced immediately and the trader reprimanded. In limited cases, an 
“active” breach of a limit would be preapproved to take advantage of an opportunity. A 
“passive” breach caused by a move in the market price or some other unintentional act, 




5 Also it should be noted that risk appetite has become much more popular and more utilized as a metric than 
it was in 2008.  
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Figure 4: Lehman’s Treatment of Risk Limit Breaches  
Type of Breach Escalation Resolution 
Active Breach/ Trader 
Action: The breach occurs 
because of trader activity. 
Bring to management’s 
attention. 
The position is reduced. 
And the trader is 






limit is breached due to a 
preapproved action that 
takes advantage of an 
attractive opportunity. 
None, as overage would 
have been preapproved by 
management. 
Position maintained and 
managed. 
Passive Breach: The limit is 
breached due to market 
swing(s). 
Bring to management’s 
attention. 
Evaluate position and 
generally reduce slowly or 
offset. 
Source: Lehman Market Risk Management 2008; Examiner’s Report; Antoncic 2010. 
4.   Lehman’s 2006 Growth Strategy 
In early 2006 Lehman adopted a new business strategy. It intended to grow by increasing 
commercial real estate, leveraged loans, and private equity—businesses that consumed 
more capital and were generally riskier and more illiquid than its traditional lines of 
business. This change represented a switch from a low-risk brokerage model to a high-risk, 
capital-intensive banking model. Prior to 2006, Lehman would acquire assets such as loans, 
primarily to “move” them to third parties, such as through securitization. With its new 
strategy, Lehman acquired assets to “store” them as its own investments, retaining the risk 
and returns of those investments on its books. The acquisitions were supported by increases 
in debt.  
Even before adopting the new strategy, Lehman was highly leveraged and like its investment 
bank peers, borrowed billions of dollars daily to fund operations. (See YPFS case study 
Wiggins et al. 2014A for more discussion of Lehman’s business model.) An increase in its 
illiquid assets posed the risk, among others, that it might eventually have difficulty 
identifying sufficient assets to provide as collateral for needed borrowings and that it might 
be unable to sell assets quickly if it needed to in order to raise cash other than through 
borrowings.  
Lehman began increasing its position in these three classes of high-risk assets in 2006. 
Shortly thereafter, the real estate market began to slow down and then dramatically 
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declined. Lehman encountered difficulty in its planned securitizing of mortgages and was 
constrained to retain many more than it had intended. Yet, in May 2007, Lehman joined with 
the Tishman Speyer firm to purchase Archstone Real Estate Investment Trust, the largest 
residential REIT in the country, for approximately $22 billion, an amount that several market 
analysts and rating agencies thought was excessive and one that required Lehman to take on 
more debt.  
By late 2007, Lehman held assets of $700 billion on equity of $25 billion with $675 billion of 
liabilities, most of which were short term. Still, well into the first quarter of 2008, as the 
subprime crisis unfolded and its competitors fled the increasingly “sticky” real-estate-
related assets, Lehman continued to purchase them.  
The company doubled its holdings in various types of illiquid investments from $87 billion 
in 2006 to $175 billion by the end of the first quarter of 2008. By May 31, 2008, Lehman had 
$50.4 billion, plus an additional $9.5 billion of corporate debt and equity, in real-estate-
related assets. (YPFS case study Wiggins et al. 2014 A discusses Lehman’s shift in assets in 
more detail.)  
Lehman’s exposure to the commercial real estate market was much greater than that of its 
competitors, despite its smaller size. A July 2008 report by the Office of Thrift Supervision 
(OTS Report), which regulated one of the Lehman subsidiaries, found Lehman “materially 
overexposed” in real estate and related assets. The report concluded that there were “major 
failings in the risk management process” and cast a somber tone: “The ability to sell or 
otherwise dispose of a very substantial portion of its exposure, without having to accept fire-
sale prices, together with a possible capital raise, may be key to the survival of LBHI as an 
independent firm” (OTS Report, 2). Despite this conclusion, however, the bankruptcy 
examiner did not uncover any actions taken by the OTC to try to prevent Lehman’s further 
demise and criticized it, as well as the SEC and the Federal Reserve (the Fed), for not doing 
more. (See Section 6 The Regulatory Framework below. Also see Examiner’s Report, Vol. 8, 
Appendix 8.) 
5.   Changes in Lehman’s Risk Management after 2006 
As it pursued its new growth strategy, Lehman made several changes to its risk management 
system and exceeded and disregarded a number of its risk limits, important controls that 
were designed to monitor financial integrity.  
Escalation of Risk Appetite Limits 
According to Lehman’s policy and practice, GRMD reviewed risk appetite levels each year 
and recommended the next year’s risk appetite to the executive committee for approval. 
From 2004 to 2006, increases in the company-wide risk appetite limit had been modest, 
increasing from $1.8 billion to $2.1 billion in 2005, and then to $2.3 billion in 2006. Prior to 
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its adoption of the new growth strategy, Lehman’s firm-wide risk appetite usage had stayed 
well under its risk appetite limit, as shown in Figure 5.  
At the end of 2006, Lehman management altered the formula for calculating risk appetite 
and adopted a risk appetite limit of $3.3 billion for 2007 in support of the new strategy, over 
the objections of Antoncic, the chief risk officer. This was a much greater increase than had 
been implemented in the past. Had the old formula been utilized, the risk appetite would 
have been set at $2.5 billion. (See Examiner’s Report, Vol. 8, Appendix 10 for a detailed 
analysis of the 2006 and 2007 risk appetite limits.) 
With the adoption of the new growth strategy, there was also a noticeable increase in 
Lehman’s risk appetite usage against the limit. The Archstone acquisition was excluded from 
the usage calculation for a number of months, and when added in, immediately caused an 
overage, which persisted, even when the firm increased the risk appetite limit to $3.5 billion 
in September 2007. In January 2008, the executive committee increased the risk appetite 
limit to $4 billion, and based on the new calculation, the overage was eliminated. Had the 
pre-2006 calculation been used, the level would have been set at $2.46 billion (Ibid.). 
 
Figure 5: Average Monthly Risk Usage Total Firm  
 
Source: Lehman Risk Presentation 2007, 22. 
 
Personnel Changes 
From mid-2006 onward, there were other changes in how the company viewed risk besides 
the increasing risk appetite usage. Increasingly, the GRMD staff found themselves 
marginalized. Risk managers were consulted less and excluded from meetings that they had 
previously been part of. What had been routine consultative discussions became push and 
pull contests. As the environment changed, Antoncic walked a fine line, continuing to try to 
negotiate risks out of deals or limit the number of new risky transactions. However, 
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progressively, as it pursued its growth strategy Lehman relied less on its risk management 
framework and personnel (Examiner’s Report, vol. 1, 46). In September 2007, Lehman 
announced that Antoncic would assume the new position of global head of financial market 
policy relations as of December 31, 20086 (Ibid., 46 and 149). Christopher O’Meara, a former 
chief financial officer, who was regarded as very knowledgeable about the business, but who 
had little experience in managing risk, became the new CRO. During his first months as CRO, 
O’Meara also spent significant time backstopping Erin Callan in her new role as chief 
financial officer, a role that many inside and external to the firm felt she was ill prepared for 
(Examiner’s Report, Vol. 8, Appendix 8, 48). 
Disregard of Risk Limit Overages 
O’Meara aligned the GRMD with management’s business objectives in favor of approving 
deals, including treating the risk appetite limit as a “soft guideline,” notwithstanding 
Lehman’s continuing representations to the SEC, rating agencies, and its board that the limit 
was a “meaningful constraint on the firm’s risk taking” (Examiner’s Report, Vol. 1, 51 and 
139-154). During 2007, numerous individual risk limits were repeatedly breached and not 
remedied: (1) risk limits with respect to its principal investments, (2) concentration limits 
on its leveraged loan and commercial real estate business, (3) single transaction limits on 
leveraged loans, and (4) single transaction limits in the leveraged-lease bridge loans and 
commercial real estate areas. (Ibid., 50). There was so much confusion in the firm that 
several executives emailed each other questioning whether they even had limits (Ibid.). 
The Archstone Deal 
The most outsized example of Lehman’s disregard for its risk limits was its purchase of the 
Archstone REIT with Tishman Speyer in a deal valued at approximately $22 billion. The deal 
was announced on May 29, 2007, and received repeated reviews by Lehman’s board and 
management prior to closing in October of that year. “The Archstone deal was an enormous 
commitment by Lehman, both in terms of debt financing and equity. After bringing in BofA 
[sic] and Barclays, Lehman agreed to make a permanent equity investment of $250 million; 
agreed to purchase bridge equity of approximately $2.3 billion; and also agreed to fund 
various debt tranches totaling $8.5 billion” (Examiner’s Report, Vol.1, 110). Despite the size 
of the deal, however, Lehman’s risk management personnel had “minimal input” in 
reviewing the transaction (Ibid., 108).7 At first, the Archstone deal was excluded from the 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
6 The press release issued by Lehman included the following wording: “She [Antoncic] has been the global 
head of Risk Management for the past five years having joined the Firm in 1999 as head of risk policy. During 
this time she oversaw the development and implementation of our comprehensive risk framework. In 
recognition of her many accomplishments, she was named bank risk manager of the year by Risk magazine 
last year.” 
7 Following its annual review, the OTC issued a negative report “criticizing Lehman for being ‘materially 
overexposed’ in the commercial real estate market and for entering into the Archstone deal without sound 
risk management practices. The report concluded that Lehman’s breach of risk limits, caused largely by the 
Archstone deal, contributed to ‘major failings in the risk management process.’” (Examiner’s Report, vol.1, 
112 (footnotes omitted)).  
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firm’s risk usage calculations. When added, the deal caused Lehman to exceed its firm-wide 
risk appetite limit, an overage that persisted for months. Management finally informed the 
board of the overage at the October 2007 board meeting but did not disclose the full extent 
of the overage or that on that day the firm’s risk appetite usage was $4.269 billion, $769 
million above its risk appetite limit of $3.5 billion (Ibid., 141-44). The overage generally 
remained outstanding in various amounts, until January 14, 2008, when the firm-wide risk 
appetite limit was increased to $4 billion, using a new aggressive calculation, as discussed in 
Section 5 (Ibid., 153). 
The bankruptcy examiner also considered Lehman’s disregard of its limits, finding it 
“unwise,” but ultimately concluded that management’s disregard of a voluntary and internal 
risk management system did not rise to an actionable claim: 
Although Lehman’s risk appetite limits ultimately provided little or no limiting 
function at all, the examiner does not find that the decision to exceed or disregard 
these limits gives rise to a colorable claim of breach of fiduciary duty. These internal 
limits were intended only for the guidance of Lehman’s own management; they did 
not put any legal constraints on the scope of management’s authority. And because 
business in general and investment banking in particular is an inherently risky 
enterprise, Lehman’s management was entitled to pursue a countercyclical growth 
strategy based on its evaluation of the markets and of Lehman’s business, even if that 
strategy necessarily posed a risk to the firm. Moreover, Lehman’s risk appetite limit 
overages were reported to the SEC. The examiner does not find that management’s 
decision to increase and then exceed Lehman’s risk appetite levels gives rise to a 
colorable claim for breach of fiduciary duties. (Examiner’s Report, Vol. 1, 180-1). 
Stress Tests Altered 
When it first developed its stress tests, Lehman had excluded its proprietary investments, 
which were then a small portion of its assets. However, as the company pursued its new 
strategy and as its proprietary positions in commercial real estate investments, private 
equity investments, and leveraged loan commitments (its riskiest positions) became a 
greater portion of its holdings, it never sought to include these in its stress test calculations 
(Examiner’s Report, Vol.8, Appendix 12). In addition, Lehman also excluded the Archstone 
deal from its stress tests (Ibid.). As a result, as the financial markets experienced increasing 
turmoil, and the real estate markets seized, Lehman operated without a measure of just what 
risks it was assuming.  
6.   The Regulatory Framework 
The SEC’s Consolidated Supervised Entity (CSE) Program  
In 2004, the SEC implemented a new program designed to supervise investment banks that 
were the parents of regulated broker-dealers that otherwise would have become subject to 
the requirements of the Basel II regulations in order to continue doing business in the 
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European Union. The consolidated supervised entity (CSE) program was designed to allow 
the SEC to monitor a CSE holding company or its unregulated affiliates for financial or 
operational weaknesses that might place U.S. regulated broker-dealers and other regulated 
entities at risk.  
In 2004, Lehman, like most of its investment bank peers, voluntarily became a CSE, 
subjecting its entire business to SEC supervision. As a CSE, Lehman was required to, and was 
found to, meet certain capital requirements and to maintain a system of internal controls and 
risk management incorporating certain specified financial metrics: capital, leverage, 
liquidity, risk management, and stress tests. The firm was required to provide information 
to the SEC on a regular basis, and it was found to have done so. The SEC had the authority to 
impose additional supervisory conditions or other sanctions on Lehman if it failed in any 
material way to comply with the CSE program requirements. (Lehman was also required to 
report on risk limits in its annual report and periodic reports on Form 10-K and 10-Q.) One 
SEC official described the program thus: 
The CSE program provides consolidated supervision to investment bank holding 
companies that is designed to be broadly consistent with Federal Reserve oversight 
of bank holding companies. This prudential regime is crafted to allow the Commission 
to monitor for, and act quickly in response to, financial or operational weakness in a 
CSE holding company or its unregulated affiliates that might place regulated entities, 
including U.S.- and foreign-registered banks and broker-dealers, or the broader 
financial system at risk” (Colby 2007). 
In its role as regulator, the SEC regularly met with Lehman to discuss its business operations. 
Various reports that illustrated the company’s risk usage and profile were shared on a 
periodic basis. As noted earlier, in 2005 the SEC found that Lehman’s risk management 
systems were very adequate for its then current business.8 However, one must question how 
closely the agency monitored changes in Lehman’s business and reevaluated the sufficiency 
of these systems as Lehman’s business model changed. 
After the fire sale of Bear Stearns to JPMorgan Chase in March 2008, SEC personnel were 
embedded at Lehman on a continuous basis and received financial data daily. At some point, 
SEC personnel became aware of the many risk limit overages at Lehman. However, the SEC 
did not exercise its powers to compel Lehman to take any remedial or precautionary action 
regarding these issues.  
After Lehman filed for bankruptcy, the SEC was criticized for sitting idly by while the firm 
collapsed. Within just weeks, the remaining two stand-alone investment banks, Morgan 
Stanley and Goldman Sachs, had announced their intention to become bank holding 
companies subject to regulation by the Fed and subject to its arguably more robust risk 
management requirements and oversight. Thus, considering that Bear Stearns had been 
acquired by JPMorgan Chase in March 2008, and that Merrill Lynch was to be acquired by 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
8 “[T]he market and credit risk management function at Lehman is robust given their current risk profile. 
Taking into account planned enhancements, Lehman will meet or exceed the minimum CSE standards” (SEC 
CSE Review). 
75
The Lehman Brothers Bankruptcy B: Risk Limits and Stress Tests Wiggins and Metrick
   
 
 
Bank of America shortly after Lehman’s collapse, the independent investment bank model 
had ceased to exist. 
The SEC quickly terminated the CSE program, conceding that “voluntary regulation doesn’t 
work”:  
As I have reported to the Congress multiple times in recent months, the CSE program 
was fundamentally flawed from the beginning, because investment banks could opt 
in or out of supervision voluntarily. The fact that investment bank holding companies 
could withdraw from this voluntary supervision at their discretion diminished the 
perceived mandate of the CSE program, and weakened its effectiveness” (SEC Press 
Release, Sept. 26, 2008). 
Yet, the question of what the SEC could have done to stave off Lehman’s demise remains 
unanswered, and skepticism persists about whether the enhanced risk management systems 
required by the Fed will be any more effective at preventing the next financial crisis. As 
Anton Valukas, Lehman Bankruptcy Examiner, later argued, “So the agencies were 
concerned. They gathered information. They monitored. But no agency regulated.” 
(For further information on this point see the SEC’s CSE Review of Lehman and this NY Times 
article discussing the CSE program, Labaton 2008.) 
The Role of the Federal Reserve   
Prior to October 2008 
In the months prior to Lehman’s demise, the New York Federal Reserve (NYFed), similar to 
the SEC, had examiners on site at the bank. According to Thomas C. Baxter, executive vice 
president and general counsel for the NYFed, it monitored Lehman, not as its regulator, but 
as a potential lender (Baxter 2010). After the near failure of Bear Stearns and its purchase 
by JPMorgan in March 2008, the NYFed introduced two new financing vehicles to address 
the liquidity crunch that the banks were experiencing—the term securities lending facility 
(TSLF) and the primary dealer credit facility (PDCF)—and sent small teams of two monitors 
into each of the four remaining major investment banks, Goldman Sachs, Merrill Lynch, 
Morgan Stanley, and Lehman Brothers, something it had never done before. Although the 
NYFed received daily financial information from Lehman and ran stress tests to evaluate its 
financial worthiness during its final months, it has maintained that its purpose was only that 
of a concerned lender and not as the (presumably more responsible and powerful) 
supervisor or regulator of the bank (Ibid.). 
October 2008 and Later 
Once the remaining investment banks became bank holding companies subject to regulation 
by the Fed, it wasted no time. In October 2008, the Fed issued Supervisory Letter 08-08 and 
Supervisory Letter 08-09, providing guidance to the new bank holding companies and 
setting out the key elements to an effective risk management program: 
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(1) Active board and senior management oversight; 
(2) Adequate written policies, procedures, and limits;  
(3) Adequate risk measurement, monitoring, and management information systems; 
(4) Comprehensive internal controls.  
A bank’s policies were expected to reflect the size and sophistication of the bank operations 
and to be in writing. Directors were expected to have an understanding of the types of risk 
the banks take on and to periodically review reports on the company’s risks. Special 
emphasis was placed on firm-wide compliance, reviewing risk across business lines and legal 
entities.  
Regulations proposed by the Fed under the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act (Dodd-Frank), and approved as final in February 2014, subsume the above 
Fed Bank Holding Company rules and continue the emphasis on firm-wide comprehensive 
risk management functions for U.S. and foreign bank holding companies with over $50 billion 
in assets. The final rule implements capital planning and stress testing requirements as an 
enhanced prudential standard. Covered bank holding companies with over $50 billion in 
assets are required to establish an enterprise-wide risk management committee, including a 
committee of the board of directors, to whom the CRO would report (dually with reporting 
to the CEO). The companies must comply with enhanced risk management and liquidity risk 
management standards, conduct liquidity stress tests, and hold a buffer of highly liquid 
assets, based on projected funding needs during a 30-day stress event. In addition, publicly 
traded U.S. bank holding companies with total consolidated assets of $10 billion or more 
must also establish enterprise-wide risk committees (Federal Reserve 2014). (See the 
testimony of Anton R. Valukas (2010) before the House Committee on Financial Services, 
discussing the role of the SEC and the Fed in overseeing Lehman.)  
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